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LAW

Can a State Tax the Fuel
That IsSold by Non-Indian
Distributors to aTribal Gas Station?
by Bethany Berger
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Bethany Berger is an assistant
professor at Wayne State
University Law School and the
associate editor and co-author
of Felix Cohen's Handbook of
FederalIndian Law (forthcoming
2005). She may be reached
at bberger@wayne.edu
or (313) 577-9774.

ISSUE
Can a state impose taxes on fuel
delivered by an off-reservation, nonIndian distributor to an on-reservation, tribally owned gas station if
the gas station customers are primarily patrons and employees of the
tribe's adjoining casino and the tax
would prevent the tribe from imposing its own tax on fuel sales?

FACTS
State taxation of reservation activity
has long been a flashpoint for conflicts between tribes and states. In
recent decades, tribes, with federal
encouragement, have pursued economic development in order to raise
revenues for government services
and increase employment among
tribal members. Freedom from state
taxation aids this economic activity
and permits tribes to impose their
own taxes. However, tribal lands are
located within state borders, and
states have their own sovereign
interests in tax collection. As more
revenue is generated on reservations and more non-Indians engage

in commercial activity there, states
have become more concerned with
loss of customers and tax revenues
to on-reservation businesses. In
some states, these conflicts have
been resolved with negotiated statetribal taxation agreements. In other
states, however, unresolved conflicts
have resulted in multiple cases
before the Supreme Court and bitter-at times violent-battles
between states and tribes.
The case now before the Court is
just one of four challenging collection of state fuel taxes since Kansas
authorized collection of taxes on
motor fuel distributed to reservation
gas stations in 1995. See Sac & Fox
ation Qf Missouri -v. Pierce, 213
F.3d 566 (10th Cir. 2000);
Winnebago Tribe Qf Nebraska v.
Kline, 2005 WL 16837(O (D. Kan.);
Kaul v. Kansas Department of
Revenue, 970 P.2d 60 (Kan. 1998).
In 1992, Kansas entered into fiveyear intergovernmental compacts
with each of the four tribes within
its borders. It agreed not to impose
taxes on fuel sold at reservation gas
stations so long as the tribes
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imposed their own taxes amounting
to "not less than sixty percent" of
the state tax. In 1995, however, the
state amended its fuel tax statute to
remove the exemption for fuel delivered to retailers on Indian reservations. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3401 et
seq. In 1997, when its tax compacts
with the tribes expired, the state
declined to renew them.
When the state attempted to collect
taxes on fuel sold to a gas station
owned and operated by the Prairie
Band Potawatomi Nation, the tribe
sued to enjoin collection. In 2003,
the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas granted summary
judgment to the state, dismissing
the lawsuit. PrairieBand
PotawatomiNation v. Richards,
241 F.Supp. 1295 (D. Kan. 2003). In
2004, the Tenth Circuit reversed,
holding that because the profits of
the gas station were the result of
value generated by the tribe on its
reservation, federal law preempted
the state taxes. PrairieBand
PotawatomiNation v. Richards,
379 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2004).
The tribe built the gas station,
known as the "Nation Station," at a
cost of $1.5 million to serve individuals driving to the tribe's nearby
casino. The gas station is located on
tribal land approximately one and
half miles down a road that the tribe
built and maintains to provide
access to its casino. The road connects to State Highway 75, which is
the main highway connecting the
reservation to major population centers. Kansas does not provide the
tribe with assistance in maintaining
the road to the casino and gas station. The gas station is not visible
from the state highway, and its gas
is sold at within two cents a gallon
of the prevailing market rate. Its
draw, therefore, is not the price of
gas or the state highway, but its
proximity to the tribe's casino.
Seventy-three percent of the Nation

Station's customers are patrons or
employees of the casino; an additional 11 percent are either employees of other tribal businesses or
reservation residents.
The tribe purchases gas for the station from a non-Indian distributor
located off reservation. The tribe
imposed tribal taxes of 16 cents per
gallon of gasoline sold at the station
at the time the litigation was
brought and raised these taxes to 20
cents per gallon in 2003. (Taxes on
1 diesel fuel were initially 18 cents a
gallon and increased to 22 cents in
2003.) The tribe's annual revenue
from the tax is about $300,000 per
year. The tribe uses all of this revenue to help maintain 118 miles of
road on the reservation. The
remaining 45 percent of the roads
on the reservation, including the
major roads that connect the reservation to other parts of the state,
are maintained by state and local
governments. The state imposes a
fuel tax of 23 cents per gallon on
gasoline and 25 cents on diesel and
uses the revenue from this tax to
defray the cost of road construction
and maintenance. Kan. Stat. Ann. §
79-34,141 & 79-3425. The state provides part of this fuel tax revenue to
county and city governments for
road maintenance but does not provide fuel tax revenue to the tribe.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3425. The
tribe's expert testified and the Tenth
Circuit agreed that the tribe could
not impose both the tribal and state
taxes and continue to sell gas.
CASE ANALYSIS
State taxing power in Indian country frequently turns on whom state
law requires to pay the tax-in other words, on who bears the "legal
incidence" of the tax. If the legal
incidence of the tax falls on a tribe
or its members, the state may not
impose the tax unless congressional
authorization of the tax is unmistakably clear. See Oklahoma Tax

Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,
515 U.S. 450 (1995). If, however,
the legal incidence of the tax falls
on non-Indians or on Indian
nonmembers of the tribe, then the
state may impose the tax unless it is
preempted by federal law or would
impermissibly infringe on tribal sovereignty. Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,
515 U.S. 450 (1995); White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136 (1980).
The Court has relied primarily on
preemption analysis in evaluating
state taxes, incorporating tribal sovereignty as a factor in the test. In
the Indian law context, federal law
need not "expressly" preempt state
taxes. Instead, the Court interprets
federal intent against a backdrop of
tribal sovereignty and federal protection of that sovereignty. This
interpretation, in turn, requires a
"particularized inquiry into the
nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry
designed to determine whether, in
the specific context, the exercise of
state authority would violate federal
law." White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker,448 U.S. 136 (1980); see
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989);
Ramah Navajo School Board v.
Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico,
458 U.S. 832 (1982). The Tenth
Circuit relied on this "balancing
test" in rejecting the state fuel tax.
The State of Kansas now asks the
Supreme Court to rule that this test
should no longer be applied.
The Court first clearly applied a balancing test in Washington v.
Contfederated Tribes qf the Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980). There, the Court held that
the State of Washington could
impose its cigarette taxes on the
sales of cigarettes to non-Indians by
reservation tribal retailers even
(Continued on Page 38)
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though the imposition of this state
tax would dry up the tribal business,
which was generated wholly by the
market for tax-free cigarettes. In
that case, the Court emphasized
that the tribes were essentially
.marketing a tax exemption" and
that although they did have an
interest in generating tribal revenue,
"that interest is strongest when the
revenues are derived from value
generated on the reservation by
activities involving the Tribes and
when the taxpayer is the recipient
of tribal services."
In subsequent cases in which a substantial portion of the value was
generated on reservation, the Court
held that the state's interest cannot
be a generalized interest in raising
revenue or the provision of services
to the non-Indian taxpayer off-reservation or unrelated to the taxed
activity but must include an onreservation contribution to the value taxed. Ramah Navajo School
Board v. Bureau of Revenue qf New
Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136 (1980). Applying the
test, the Court in 1987 held that
California could not regulate gambling by non-Indians at tribal bingo
halls, as the tribes had generated
the value themselves by building
and running the facilities, and the
state interest in the activity was not
significant. California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
202 (1987). The Court has also
applied the test to strike down state
fuel taxes on non-Indians contracting with a tribal timber industr,
White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker,448 U.S. 136 (1980), and
state income taxes on a non-Indian
contractor building an on-reservation school. Ramah Navajo School
Board v. Bureau of Revenue of New
Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982). In
both of these cases, the Court found
significant federal regulation of the
activity taxed and so did not rely on

tribal value and general federal
interests alone. In Cotton Petroleum

Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163
(1989), the Court held that the balancing test permitted state taxes on
non-Indians for oil and gas extracted from reservation lands, even
though the tribe substantially contributed to regulation of the industry, when there was a small but
"'substantial" contribution by the
I state to on-reservation oil and gas
extraction.
The decision by the Tenth Circuit in
the case now before the Court presents a very clean question regarding the proper application of the
"value added" portion of the balancing test. In contrast with Colville,
the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation
sells its gas at market prices, eliminating the specter of non-Indian
businesses being undersold by tribes
marketing a tax exemption. Both
the casino that draws potential fuel
purchasers to this rural comer of
the state and the road that leads
them there were built and maintained by the tribe. The gas station
was built and is owned and operated
by the tribe and is largely staffed by
tribal employees. Although Colville
and Cotton Petroleumboth rejected
arguments that tribal taxes preempted duplicative state taxes, this
is the first case in which a tribe
proved in the lower courts that the
imposition of state taxes would prevent the tribe from imposing its own
taxes. The tribe and its amici argue
that there is a compelling federal
interest in the tribal ability to
impose fuel taxes to generate revenue to improve reservation roads.

They cite a 2003 federal report calling the reservation road system

"among the most rudimentary" in
United States. The report noted that
the vast majority of these roads are
unpaved and "resemble roads in
developing nations." In response,
the state argues that the tribal road
leading to the gas station is itself

only accessible by State Highway
75, which the state maintains, and
that most of the gas station's customers live off the reservation and
receive state services. In their amicus brief, the National Association
of Convenience Stores, the
Petroleum Marketers Association of
America, and Society of Gasoline
Marketers of America emphasize
that the value of the gas itself is created off reservation.
However, the state focuses its arguments on the contention that the
balancing test should not be applied
to state taxing jurisdiction at all. It
asks the Court to take up thenAssociate Justice William H.
Rehnquist's suggestion in his concurrence in Colville that a balancing
of interests is inappropriate and prevents the development of coherent
principles governing state taxation
in Indian country. The state petitioner, joined by amicus Multistate
Tax Commission, asks the Court to
replace the preemption test as the
Court has developed it with a test
that would require there be specific
congressional intent before a court
could hold a state tax on nonIndians preempted by federal law.
This test, they argue, would prevent
case-by-case litigation in this area of
law, increase predictability, and create bright lines for tax administration. As they point out, in 1995 the
Court rejected requests by the State
of Oklahoma to apply a balancing
test to that state's taxation of tribal
members, stating that a categorical
test in that area served the need for
predictability in tax liability.
Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450
(1995). In that case, however, the
Court was following the trend of its
past opinions. Since Colville was
decided, the Court has repeatedly,
including in opinions by the late
Chief Justice Rehnquist, affirmed
and applied the balancing test.

Issue No. 1

~%
The respondent tribe and its amici
argue that the balancing test is a
necessary accommodation of tribal
sovereignty and the federal interests
in preventing state interference with
federal Indian policy. They argue
that this accommodation is appropriate given the Indian Commerce
Clause, which gives the federal government the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes and
correspondingly limits state power
in this area. They assert that the
strict preemption test that the
Petitioner proposes would result in
state taxation of virtually all onreservation commercial activity
and contradict the federal policy
of encouraging tribal economic
development.
The parties have complicated the
question before the Court by adding
arguments not essential to the ruling below. The state, in an argument
not addressed by either of the lower
courts in this case, argues that even
if the Supreme Court continues to
apply the unique preemption test
that it developed in the Indian context, that test should not be applied
in this case because the fuel tax is a
tax on off-reservation activity.
Under the Court's decision in
MescaleroApache v. Jones, 411
U.S. 145 (1973), states are free to
tax Indian activity outside reservation or Indian community boundaries absent clear federal law prohibitions. The Petitioner argues that
because the "tax is imposed on the
distributor of the first receipt of the
motor fuel," Kan. Stat. Ann. § 7979 3
- 408(c), and first receipt of the
motor fuel occurs outside the reservation, the Indian law preemption
test is irrelevant.
The Respondent tribe and its amici
argue that even if the incidence of
the tax falls on the distributor, the
tax itself is "imposed on the use,
sale or delivery" of motor vehicle
fuels, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3408(a),

and the sale or delivery of fuels
occurs on the reservation. They
point out that the distributor of first
receipt need not pay taxes on fuels
sold to another distributor or
exported from the state and may
claim a refund for taxes paid on fuel
destroyed or lost before delivery.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3417. Even if
the taxable event in this case is not
on the reservation, they argue, the
Court's past cases have applied the
preemption test in such situations
so long as the taxes directly affected
economic activity on the reservation. Several states submitted an
amicus brief that did not opine on
the location of the taxable activity
in this case but urged the Court to
affirm that the preemption test does
not apply to activities outside reservation boundaries.
The tribe also argues that because
the tax is actually on the on-reservation sale of fuel to the tribe, the
tax is preempted by federal Indian
trader statutes. Since 1790, elaborate statutes and regulations have
governed the conduct of those selling goods and services to Indians on
reservations. The Supreme Court
has twice held that these statutes
preempt state taxation of nonIndians for their on reservation
sales to Indians. CentralMachinery
Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Commission, 448 U.S. 160 (1980);
Warren Trading Post v. Arizona
Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685
(1965). The state argues, however,
that these cases concerned sales to
tribes or their members for their
own use, and that these cases have
been limited by the Court's decision
in Department of Taxation and
Finance v. Milhelm Attea, 512 U.S.
61 (1994), which held that New
York could impose extensive recordkeeping requirements on retailers
and wholesalers to enforce state cigarettes taxes on sales to nonIndians. The Tenth Circuit previously rejected the argument that the

Indian trader statutes preempted
Kansas's fuel tax in Sac & Fox
Nation of Missouri v. Pierce, 213
F.3d 566 (10th Cir. 2000), and the
lower court decisions in this case
did not address this argument.
Amicus United States also argues
that the legal incidence of the
Kansas fuel tax actually falls on the
tribal retailers and is therefore
invalid. Where the legal incidence of
a state tax lies is a question of interpretation of state law. While federal
courts grant great deference to
authoritative state interpretations of
the law, the question is ultimately
one for the federal courts to decide.
The Kansas statute explicitly states
that the incidence of the tax falls on
the distributor of the fuel. The state
apparently drafted the statute in
this manner to ensure that it could
tax gas distributed to tribal retailers.
In the earlier litigation by the other
Kansas tribes, the Tenth Circuit
held that the legal incidence of the
tax did in fact fall on the non-Indian
fuel distributors. Sac & Fox Nation
of Missouri v. Pierce, 213 F.3d 566
(10th Cir. 2000). The Tenth Circuit
also relied on this holding in its
decision in this case. The United
States, however, argues that the
Kansas Supreme Court held in 1999
that the statute read as a whole
placed the legal incidence of the tax
on retailers. Kaul v. Kansas
Department of Revenue, 970 P.2d
60 (Kan. 1998). Petitioner responds
that that decision concerned only
the "standing" of the nontribal
retailers to challenge the tax. The
United States argues that the conclusion of the Kansas court is correct because the statute provides
that distributors may collect the
amount of the tax from retailers,
and that signs posting fuel prices
I must clearly include the amount of
the tax. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3409.
In addition, the United States points
I out, distributors need not pay the
(Continued on Page 40)
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tax on fuel sold to retailers or users
such as the United States or other
states that are exempt from state
taxes. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 793408(d)(1) & (2). In Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,
515 U.S. 450 (1995), the Court stated that states were free to amend
their statutes to shift the legal incidence of fuel taxes away from tribal
retailers. In other contexts, however, the Court has emphasized that
otherwise invalid taxes on tribal
members were not made valid by
changes in the "mere nomenclature" that did not change the function of the tax. Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
163-64 (1980); see Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Sac and Fox Tribe,
508 U.S. 114, 126-27 (1993).
SIGNIFICANCE
If the Court holds that explicit congressional preemption is necessary
for non-Indians doing business with
tribes to be exempt from state taxation, it will remove most of the
immunity from state taxation held
by those who do business with
Indians on reservations. Under the
test developed in Colville, much
commercial activity with nonIndians is already subject to state
taxation. Relying on Colville's valueadded test, however, tribes such as
the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation
have developed businesses and
industries in which they create
most of the value themselves. A
decision in favor of the tribe would
encourage these efforts. A decision
requiring explicit preemption would
undermine them and largely prevent
tribes from imposing their own taxes on the activity. It will also conflict with the federal policy of
encouraging tribal self-determination by making exercise of tribal
territorial sovereignty dependent on
explicit federal consent. Such a
decision should not, however, significantly affect tax treatment of gain-

-

ing activities, as regulation of this
activity is extensive, and the congressional intent to prohibit taxation of these activities is relatively
explicit.
It is not clear what the effect of
such a decision would be in reducing conflict and uncertainty in state
taxation. One would think that a
bright-line test would create more
certainty than the multifactor preemption test. But tribal-state taxation questions seem to generate persistent conflict even when the test is
fairly clear. In Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Sac and Fox Tribe,
for example, the justices issued
their third decision holding that
states could not impose motor vehicle taxes on tribal members residing
in Indian country, noting that two
years earlier "we rejected precisely
the same argument-and from precisely the same litigant." 508 U.S.
114, 124 (1993). In addition, the
recent disagreements that resulted
in violent conflicts between tribal
officials and state police were ones
in which state authority to tax was
relatively established. In recent
years, many tribes and states have
been able to resolve these questions
with intergovernmental tax agreements. Although hundreds of such
compacts have been reached, the
willingness of each side to negotiate
has been based not only on a recognition of the benefits to each side in
cooperating on tax collection, but
also on the relative degree of uncertainty on the outcome of litigation.
A bright-line rule that does away
with this uncertainty may remove
an incentive to negotiate and with it
the cooperative resolution of many
of these disputes.
If the Court holds that a state can
by statute shift not only the legal
incidence but also the location of
the taxed activity so as to immunize
it from Indian law preemption
analysis, it will enable states to sig-

nificantly increase their taxation of
economic activity in Indian country.
States will often be able to statutorily shift the tax "upstream" and so
avoid the special analysis developed
in the Indian context even when the
tax will necessarily affect economic
activity in Indian country. If, on the
other hand, the Court decides that
the location of the taxed activity is
irrelevant for application of the preemption analysis, it will greatly
extend the geographic reach of the
special rules applicable to Indian
taxation. Even if the Court rules in
the tribe's favor, however, it could
do so without creating such a test. It
could instead hold that the statute
itself makes the taxable event the
use, sale, or delivery of the fuel and
conclude that these events clearly
occur on the reservation. If, however, the Court agrees with the United
States that the tax is in fact on the
retailer, this approach will undermine the apparent ease of shifting
tax liability that the Court suggested
in Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450
(1995).
Finally, it should be noted that state
taxation in Indian country was an
issue of special interest to the late
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Since the
passing of Justice Thurgood
Marshall from the Court, he had
been the strongest voice on the
Court on this subject. The Court's
decision in this case therefore may
signal the direction the jurisprudence in this area will take now that
both of those voices are silent.
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